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TWO ROADS DIVERGED: RECENT
DECISIONS ON POSSESSORY TITLE
By BRIAN BUCKNALL*
The foundations of the doctrine of possessory rights are centuries old, yet, as
Mr. Bucknall establishes, Ontario courts frequently have difficulty in applying
both the common law tests and the statutory changes enacted in the Limitations
Act. A critical examination of several cases reveals startlingjudicial inconsistency and demonstrates the need for a clearer analyticalframework within
which to determine questions of possessory title. Mr. Bucknall sets out this
framework in a series of principles designed to restate and clarify the interaction of the common law maxims and the statutory enactments.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Let Piper v. Stevenson' serve as a starting point. In 1901, Miss
Piper purchased six lots from Mr. Whaley with the intention of setting
up a farm. For some reason, Miss Piper fenced in eight rather than six
lots and began to farm them. She lived on another farm during this
period and went on the property only for the purposes of cultivating
and harvesting. In 1905 and 1906 she had buildings constructed and
moved to her new farm. In 1911, the holder of paper title to the two
erroneously enclosed lots sold them to Mr. Stevenson. Mr. Stevenson
knocked down Miss Piper's fences and himself fenced off the lands
which Miss Piper thought she owned and Miss Piper sued successfully
for a declaration that she had acquired a possessory title.
Compare that result to the decision over sixty years later in
Masidon Investments Ltd. v. Ham.2 In 1958, Mr. Ham, a lawyer in
Oakville, rented a 100 acre parcel of !and with the intention of using it
as his residence. The landlord apparently considered that the land was
a long-term speculation in real estate and had little concern for the
actual use made by Mr. Ham. Mr. Ham was a flying enthusiast and
laid out a grassy airstrip suitable for use by light planes. It was a fair
weather field, with no electric light, radar or radio assistance. The field
did, however, become popular with other flyers and from time to time
as many as twelve planes would be parked there. Around 1967, Mr.
Copyright, 1984, Brian Bucknall.
* Brian Bucknall, B.A., LL.B., LL.M., is a partner at Osler, Hoskin and Harcourt, Toronto,
Canada.
1 (1913), 28 O.L.R. 379, 12 D.L.R. 820.
2 (1982), 39 O.R. (2d) 534 (Trial Division); (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 563 (Court of Appeal).
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Ham's landlord defaulted on his mortgage on the property and an order of foreclosure was registered against the entire 100 acres. After
some shuffling of papers, Mr. Ham's landlord re-acquired title to a fifty
acre parcel at the west end of the farm, which was the parcel on which
Mr. Ham lived, while Masidon Investments Ltd. held title to the fifty
acre parcel at the east end of the farm, which was the parcel on which
Mr. Ham had established his airstrip. From 1968 on, Mr. Ham continued to occupy the entire 100 acres despite the fact that his landlord
could only give him title to fifty acres. He continued to fly planes from
the east half of the parcel, to use the buildings on that side of the
parcel, to have the land cultivated by neighbouring farmers, to maintain fences and to make minor improvements to his airstrip. In 1979,
the owners of the east half of the parcel realized what had been going
on and brought action against Mr. Ham for a declaration that they
owned the lands and sued for punitive damages for his trespasses.
Masidon was successful in its suit for declaratory relief and it was held
that Mr. Ham had not acquired possessory title.
The two cases provide some striking similarities. In both, vacant
land was in question and the holders of paper title appeared to be indifferent to the steps taken by the persons in possession. The legislation
governing the claims brought in each case, the Limitations Act, 3 remained substantially the same over the entire period separating the two
decisions. On the bare facts, none of the "distinctions" so beloved of
lawyers will explain the contrast in results. One can only conclude that:
Piper v. Stevenson was wrongly decided, or Masidon v. Ham was
wrongly decided, or the law has changed.
The hallmark of the decision in Masidon is the reliance which Mr.
Justice Carruthers, at the trial level, and Mr. Justice Blair on appeal,
place on the doctrine of adversity. He concluded that whatever action
Mr. Ham took could not be inconsistent with Masidon's intention to
sell the land at a future date for development. Insofar as Ham did not
and, indeed, could not, do anything inconsistent with Masidon's intentions -

because Masidon had no intention -

Masidon's rights were

inviolable. This analysis, which on the face of it would appear to have
been equally available in Piperv. Stevenson, was not even mentioned in
the earlier case.
Before one can conclude that the law has changed in the decades
following Piperv. Stevenson, one further decision should be considered.
Beaudoin v. Aubin4 concerned a dispute over a strip of land along the
3

Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 246.

4 (1981), 21 R.P.R. 79.
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edge of a residential lot. Mr. Beaudoin and his wife rented the home
adjacent to the disputed strip of property in 1951. In 1966, they purchased the home. From 1951 on, however, they had occupied the subsequently disputed strip on the assumption that it was their own. They
learned at the time of their purchase that the strip had actually been
registered in the name of the adjoining property owners but continued
thereafter to use the lands as they had used them before. In 1979, the
adjoining owners, by this time the Aubin family, became aware of paper title and disputed Mr. Beaudoin's rights. The parties brought the
matter to court for declaratory relief. Mr. Justice Anderson specifically
reviewed the Aubins' contention that, since the occupation of the land
had arisen as the result of a mistake as to the boundary line between
the parcels, no rights whatever could accrue. That is to say, in the absence of knowledge of the true state of title to the property, there could
be no adversity and no intention to possess adversely. Mr. Justice Anderson rejected the intention test entirely and considered at length the
question of whether the intention and adversity tests were, in fact, appropriate elements of the law in Ontario. He concluded that they were
not and granted a declaration as to title to Mr. Beaudoin.
The decision in Beaudoin v. Aubin preceded the decision in
Masidon v. Ham by over a year. Curiously enough, Beaudoin was not
even discussed by Mr. Justice Carruthers in Masidon even though it
had been relied upon by counsel for Mr. Ham. The divergence in approach is almost as striking as the divergence in result between Piperv.
Stevenson and Masidon v. Ham. Nor are the two recent decisions uncharacteristic of the law in this area. Contrary to what might be professional expectations, the number of cases dealing with questions of
possessory title does not seem to diminish year by year, nor does the
jurisprudence used in those cases become more stable and consistent. It
seems that the time has come for a reconsideration of some of the underlying doctrines.
II. MASIDON INVESTMENTS LTD. V. HAM: NEW APPLICATIONS OF THE ADVERSITY TEST
Mr. Justice Carruthers:The Trial Decision
The judgment in Masidon v. Ham is disturbing for a number of
reasons. Mr. Justice Carruthers at one point casually referred to the
issue of whether "a prescriptive right has been acquired" as if prescriptive rights and possessory titles were the same thing. 5 The text writers
' Supra note 2, at 544 (T.D.). Gushue J.A. made a similar error recently in Re Lundrigans
Ltd. and Prosper(1982), 132 D.L.R. (3d) 727 at 730. (Prescription is the concept applicable to
non-possessory rights such as easements or rights of way.)
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generally recognize these as being two conceptually independent
(though sometimes factually similar) bodies of law. 6 More importantly,
there are suggestions throughout the decision that some of the basic
doctrines with regard to possessory titles have been misunderstood. Mr.
Justice Carruthers concluded, at one point, that Mr. Ham had, by perhaps improper means, "fashioned a design to acquire possessory title to
the lands in dispute."7 Later, while considering the onus which a person
claiming possessory title must bear, he pointed out that "the relevant
provisions of the Limitations Act did not come into being in order to
promote the obtaining of possessory title."8 In the traditional analysis,
the Limitations Act had no relationship whatever to the "acquisition"
or "obtaining" of possessory title. Possession was, in its nature, a species of title assertable against the entire world other than the true owner. A stranger to Masidon as well as to Mr. Ham could not have asserted any rights to the lands while Mr. Ham was in possession on the
basis that Masidon, in fact, had a better title than Mr. Ham. From the
beginning of the common law period, Mr. Ham's possession in those
circumstances would have been defended and the raising of the jus tertii would have been rejected.9 By this analysis Mr. Ham, Miss Piper
and Mr. Beaudoin had obtained possessory title to the lands which they
claimed at the time that they respectively went into possession. The
Limitations Act did not create that title. The Act simply established
situations in which such title became indefeasible through the lapse of
time. Section 15 of the Act reflects the situation precisely. When a
limitations period had elapsed against a person who has established a
possessory title, the former title is extinguished. Nothing is said about
the creation of a new title or a transfer of title from the former owner
to the new owner.
This misinterpretation of the principles underlying possessory doctrines is reflected in a plethora of findings of fact and statements of law
which may or may not bear on the issues at hand. Mr. Justice Carruthers found, for example, that the holder of an interest in the disputed
lands had not been put on notice that Mr. Ham was making use of
them, even though in 1974 they received a property appraisal which
made reference to the "private airstrip for small aircraft." 10 The impli8

7

See, for example, Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property (3d. ed., 1966) at 996.
Supra note 2, at 547 (T.D.).

8 Id. at 553.
0 Cheshire's Modern Law of Real Property (9th ed., 1962) at 799-800.
10 Supra note 2, at 541 (T.D.).
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cation is clearly that the degree of knowledge which the holder of paper
title has with regard to the use of the disputed lands is important. The
absence of such knowledge somehow improves the position of the
holder of paper title. The point is not explored, nor is acknowledgement
given to the fact that the Limitations Act specifically makes reference
to knowledge of use by another party in only one instance: where the
lands are in a "state of nature."'" The fact that, by statute, knowledge
becomes a question in that instance would suggest that it is not an issue
in other instances and, indeed, the cases have so held.12
Similarly, Mr. Justice Carruthers noted that "there is no evidence
that Ham ever attempted to exclude the plaintiffs or anyone representing them or their interests from any portions of the lands in dispute,"' 3
while at the same time finding that "the plaintiffs have never been on,
at or over the lands in dispute."' 4 How Mr. Ham might have successfully excluded people who did not wish to enter is a conundrum. It was
held against Mr. Ham that when an Ontario Municipal Board hearing
took place, concerning the zoning of the lands, he knew of it but did
not appear. It stands to the favour of Masidon that its representatives
did appear. The relevance to the issues at hand of Mr. Ham's failure to
attend is not made clear, though it is suggested that this is evidence
that Mr. Ham did not really believe that he owned the lands in question. Masidon's actions, on the other hand, appear to have suggested to
Mr. Justice Carruthers that Masidon had continued to be in "possession" of the lands in question. These facts, together with the fact that
Masidon continued to pay taxes on the lands and to consider offers for
purchase, suggested that Masidon's possession had not been discontinued. Again, the specific wording of the legislation, which provides that
"no action shall be brought" and further that a "mere entry" from
time to time will not disrupt the running of a limitations period, was
not addressed.
As mentioned previously, the heart of the matter appears to have
been that the use which Mr. Ham made of the property was not appropriate for the running of a limitations period. In this respect Mr. Justice Carruthers relied heavily on the decisions of Madame Justice Wilson, then of the Ontario Court of Appeal, in Keefer v. Arillotta"5 and
"'

Supra note 3, s. 5(4).
'2McGugan v. Turner, [1948] O.R. 216. See generally Beaudoin v. Aubin, supra note 4. See
also, contra, Lutz v. Kawa (1981), 112 D.L.R. (3d) 271, which is not followed in Beaudoin v.

Aubin.
" Supra note
14 Id. at 539.

2, at 550 (T.D.).

10(1976), 13 O.R. (2d) 680, 72 D.L.R. (3d) 182.
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in Fletcher v. Storoschuk.16 One extract which Mr. Justice Carruthers
took from the Keefer decision conveys the essence of the argument:
The use an owner wants to make of his property may be a limited use and an
intermittent or sporadic use. A possessory title cannot, however, be acquired
against him by depriving him of uses of his property that he never intended or
desired to make of it. The animus possidendi which a person claiming a possessory title must have is an intention to exclude the owner from such uses as the
owner wants to make of his property."

Both Madame Justice Wilson and Mr. Justice Carruthers relied on the
old English case of Leigh v. Jack 8 for this proposition.
Madame Justice Wilson's words create the implication that possessory title is "acquired" by some ongoing process. Implicitly, the old
doctrine that an estate in possession will either exist or not exist at any
given instant in time, and will become indefeasible through the provisions of the statute, is ignored. Secondly, the quotation identifies not
one but two tests of intention where a possessory interest is to be
claimed. There is, first, the intention of the person in possession, which
must be to "exclude the owner from such uses as the owner wants to
make," and second, the intention of the owner, which may be to make
some use, or no use, of the lands. To phrase the principle positively, a
person in possession of lands which he does not own can "acquire" title
only if he knows that he does not own the lands, knows who does own
the lands, knows the intentions which the true owner has with regard to
the use of the lands, and acts in a manner inconsistent with those
intentions.
The phrasing of the principle in a positive form does, of course,
display its weaknesses. Proof of any intention is difficult, especially over
a ten year period. Certainly there would be few owners who would confess to having any immediate and consistent intention to use lands
which they have not tried to occupy for over a decade. Mr. Justice
Carruthers himself confessed that his approach to the doctrine may
well mean that possessory title cannot be obtained against "development land which is in the holding stage."' 9 Further, the formulation is
almost impossible to apply in what is the most common instance, situations where both the paper title holder and the possessor are simply
mistaken about the nature and extent of their respective rights and
cannot therefore establish an intention consistent with the proposed leI6 (1981),

35 O.R. (2d) 722, 18 D.L.R. (3d) 59.

'7Supra note 15, at 691 (O.R.).
18(1879), 5 Ex. D. 264.
19 Supra note 2, at 553 (T.D.).
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gal test.
If the test of "adversity of usage" were definitive, it would be sufficient in the Masidon case to show only that, while Mr. Ham was in
possession, Masidon did not have any specific expectations with regard
to the land nor any desire to use it. Nothing could then have been
inconsistent with its rights. Mr. Justice Carruthers was not, however,
content to rely simply on this point but, as mentioned earlier, went on
to consider a variety of associated issues. He even considered the actual
usage made by Mr. Ham as opposed to his intentions in using the land.
He found, for example, that Mr. Ham's use of a portion of the land for
growing crops was "at most seasonal and intermittent and therefore not
meeting the required test."20 This precise point had previously been
considered in Piper v. Stevenson and resolved in the opposite manner.
The use of the buildings, including a "hanger" for the airplanes was
similarly insufficient to run a possessory period. The use of the airstrip
was found to be "open, notorious and peaceful" but Mr. Justice Carruthers questioned "whether it was constant and continuous" or that it
was "exclusive of the right of the true owner."'" Whatever his intentions, a person hoping to claim possessory title will have to be vigourous
in his occupation of the lands in question if Mr. Justice Carruthers is to
be satisfied.
Mr. Justice Blair: The Decision on Appeal
Mr. Ham appealed the decision of Mr. Justice Carruthers and
took the matter before Justices Zuber, Blair and Goodman of the
Court of Appeal. Mr. Justice Blair wrote on behalf of the bench.
Mr. Justice Blair rehearsed Mr. Justice Carruthers' factual determinations and adopted his view of the law, going even to the extent of
implying that prescriptive and possessory title amounted to the same
thing.22 Again, the decisions of Madame Justice Wilson on this topic,
and particularly the decision in Keefer v. Arillotta, were central to the
analysis.23 Mr. Justice Blair summarized the principles applicable to
possessory title as follows:
It is clear that the claimant with possessory title throughout the statutory period
must have:
(1) had actual possession;
(2) had the intention of excluding the true owner from possession;

20
21
22

Id. at 551.
Id. at 552.
Supra note 2, at 567 (C.A.).

23 Id.
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(3) effectively excluded the true owner from possession."

Mr. Justice Blair noted that "the claim will fail unless the claimant
meets each of these three tests and time will begin to run against the
owner only from the last date when all of them are satisfied."' 25
Mr. Ham was found to have failed to meet the tests. It is not
clear, however, whether he failed on one branch, two branches or all
three branches of the analysis. The major issue appears to be whether
he "effectively excluded the possession of the true owner." The concept
of "effective exclusion" is, in Mr. Justice Blair's treatment, the obverse
of the coin of "adversity". A holder of paper title who has no interest in
coming on the land cannot be "excluded" by the person in possession.
To put the matter another way, a person in possession cannot hold adversely to the interest of someone who does not care what is happening
to the land.
It may also be that Mr. Ham failed to demonstrate to the satisfaction of Mr. Justice Blair that he had been in "actual possession" of the
land. Mr. Ham's use of the land is treated as being a series of trespasses over an extended period of time, none of which could be connected into a period of actual possession. 26 Mr. Ham is found not to
have had "the requisite intention to exclude the true owner from possession."' 27 If such an intention was formed by Mr. Ham it was formed
only toward the end of his period of use of the land and, in accordance
with the principles quoted above, any possessory period which arose
could arise only after that intention could be shown to have existed. 28
In Mr. Justice Blair's view (and it is a view echoed by Mr. Justice
Robins in the recent Court of Appeal decision in Giouroukos v. Cadillac Fairview29) there is something of a moral standard to be resorted to
in the application of the doctrines of possessory title. Mr. Justice Blair
adopted Mr. Justice Carruthers' observation that perhaps possessory title cannot be obtained in circumstances where land is being held for
development purposes:
This result, however, is not surprising. There is no policy reason for concern
about the rights of the appellant in this case or, indeed, any trespassers seeking
to acquire possessory title to land held for development. The appellant deliber24

Id.

25

Id.

26
27

Id. at 571.
Id. at 575.

28

Id.

Giouroukos v. Cadillac Fairview Corp. Ltd. et al. (1984), 44 O.R. (2d) 166, 3 D.L.R.
(4th) 595, 29 R.P.R. 224.
29
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ately embarked on a course of conduct which ultimately led to an intention to
dispossess the respondents of their property. In my opinion, Justice Carruthers
was correct in concluding that the purpose of the Limitations Act was not 'to
promote the obtaining of possessory title' by a person in the position of the
appellant.30

This new test seems to cut in all directions: a person in possession
of land without intending to harm the true owner's rights will acquire
nothing, a person in possession of land with the intention of acquiring
the true owner's right will not have the assistance of the court.
III. BEAUDOIN V. AUBIN: THE ADVERSITY TEST DENIED
The facts in Beaudoin v. Aubin, as outlined above, are difficult to
analyse with reference to some test which makes the intentions of the
possessor and of the holder of paper title paramount. The parties there
proceeded on the basis of a mutual mistake with regard to their common boundary and their respective rights over the disputed land. The
holder of paper title could form no intention with regard to lands which
he did not know he owned nor could the possessor be expected to
demonstrate that he was acting adversely to the true owner's interests
since all he hoped to do was use the property which he thought he
owned. Mr. Justice Anderson was called upon to consider the entire
body of doctrine with regard to possessory title and, in a thorough and
scholarly decision, he concluded that Mr. Beaudoin had, in fact, established an indefeasible title even though he had not acted with that intention. Mr. Justice Anderson began with a close analysis of the history
of the Limitations Act. He pointed out that, prior to the passage of the
Real Property Limitation Act, 1833 in England, the common law for
both Canada and England had employed the concept of "adversity" in
a very technical sense when testing the question of whether or not a
possessory title had been established." With the passage of the Act in
1833, the focus shifted to the question of whether or not an action
against the possessor should have been brought by the true owner. The
Act, after the manner of limitations acts generally, was simply procedural in its nature, not substantive.
Mr. Justice Anderson quoted Mr. Justice Smily in McGugan v.
Turner to the effect that in the applicable section of the Limitations
Act:
30 Supra note 2, at 579 (C.A.).

31Supra note 4, at 86. See also Cheshire, supra note 9, at 787. Prior to the 1833 legislation
certain types of possession were not considered to be "adverse." Possession by a younger son, for
example, was considered to be possession by the heir. The concept of adversity was related to the
status of the possessor and bore no relationship to intention or nature of use.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[N]o exception is made

[VOL. 22, No. 2

of ignorance or mistake as to true ownership. In

fact it has been held that a common error by the owners in regard to the true

line of division between the properties does not prevent the statute running where
the statute does not require it to3 2be shown that possession was adverse and not
with acquiescence or permission.

Justice Anderson pointed out that the change in the legislation led
early commentators in Ontario to state that, for the purposes of this
province, the concept of "adverse possession" in its original form had
been abolished and the phrase had continued to be used only as a mat33
ter of convenience.
For at least fifteen years Mr. Beaudoin occupied land that he
thought was his by right. Mr. Justice Anderson had to address directly
the question of whether it was necessary to show that any particular
intention was associated with his acts. He distinguished several cases,
in which intention had been found to be an important element, by
showing that they focused on factual situations in which the acts of
possession were equivocal. He concluded that the possession of the
lands by Mr. Beaudoin was certain and unequivocal and the animus
possidendi could therefore be presumed. a4 He ended his analysis with a
condemnation of the doctrines requiring demonstration of some subjective intention:
The application of judicial statements, without due regard for the facts of the
case in which the statement is made, is a pregnant and perennial source of error.

Upon such statements the defence has propounded the argument that, before a
party can successfully rely upon Sections 4 and 15 of the statute, he must establish a subjective intention, with knowledge of the rights of the plaintiff present in
his mind, to occupy in defiance or denial of those rights. No case which I have
considered, when one looks to the facts, supports that proposition and it is utterly
inconsistent with the decisions in Martin v. Weld, Babbitt v. Clarke, Nourse v.
Clark, and McGugan v. Turner.35

IV. POSSESSION, INTENTION, ADVERSITY:
A RECONSIDERATION
While Beaudoin v. Aubin has, arguably, restated some important
Supra note 4, at 88. The quotation is from McGugan v. Turner, supra note 12, at 221.
33 The same point had, in fact, been made with regard to the English legislation of 1833,
Lord St. Leonards commented in 1852, "It is perfectly settled that adverse possession is no longer
necessary in the sense in which it was formerly used, but that mere possession may be and is
sufficient under many circumstances to give title adversely." (See Ely (Dean) v. Bliss (1852), 2
DeG.M. & G. 459 at 476, 477, 42 E.R. 950.) The English legislation, unlike the Ontario statute
uses the phrase "adverse possession" even though the original meaning of the phrase has changed.
34 Supra note 4, at 94.
35 Id. at 96, 97. Martin v. Weld (1860), 19 U.C.Q.B. 631; Babbitt v. Clarke (1925), 57 O.R.
60, [1925] 3 D.L.R. 55, affd [1927] S.C.R. 148, [1927] 2 D.L.R. 7; Nourse v. Clark, [1936]
O.W.N. 563.
32
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principles with regard to possessory title and Masidon v. Ham has,
similarly, confused the matter once more, it must not be suggested that
the tests which Mr. Justice Carruthers and Mr. Justice Blair adopted
in Masidon are wholly inapplicable. Rather, the analysis which was
applied in the Masidon case is required by the nature of the legal principles applicable to possessory titles. The objection is that the analysis
was wrongly conducted.
The doctrines of possessory title are, as suggested earlier, something of a hybrid in our law. The essential analysis goes back to medieval questions of who is seised of an interest and under what circumstances that person's seisin can be challenged. Onto this medieval root
had been grafted a branch of statutory law limiting the time within
which a challenge to the estate of the person in possession can be
brought. Perhaps it would be useful to separate the two parts of the
doctrine in order to see where the various tests of possessory usage arise
and where they can be helpful.
The possessory estate, which the common law would have protected against all persons other than the true owner, was an estate established by the possessor acting as if he had an interest of indefinite
duration (which was, therefore, a freehold interest and, furthermore, a
seised estate) which was his as of right. A mere trespass across a piece
of land, or a series of trespasses, would not give rise to the same sort of
right. Hence, the requirement that possession be continuous. A person
who asserted rights based on a stealthy or secretive use of a piece of
property would, of course, face an evidentiary problem but was also
thought not to be using the lands in a manner consistent with the assertion of a seised interest; thus the requirement that possession be open
and obvious. Similarly, a person whose sole claim to property was that
he was physically and violently keeping the true owner away was not
seen to be enjoying any estate of his own in the lands. Finally, the
common law recognized that a person who was in possession of property with the permission of the true owner was simply exercising the
true owner's rights and not enjoying an independent estate of his own.
The medieval shorthand for these doctrines was that the possession of
land which was defensible as an estate in the land was possession "nec
calme, nec vie, nec precaria" (without stealth, without violence and

without permission).
While we have, in many cases, lost sight of the foundation for the
tests which we now use, the principles remain the same. The tests for
the running of a limitations period have been reformulated for modern
application. The calls for "open, obvious and continuous" usage,
"peaceful, open and obvious usage" and "usage as of right" are, how-
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ever, all ways in which the court seeks to establish whether or not the
claimant to a possessory title has in fact been enjoying the type of estate which the common law protected.
The problem is, of course, that the usages which can and should be
made of lands are as varied as the lands themselves. Can someone, such
as the farmer in Piper v. Stevenson, who simply visits property at seed
and harvest time, be said to be in possession at all, let alone continuous
possession? Can someone, such as Miss Carson in Carsonv. Musialo,30
who walks upon a stream bank and picks flowers there from time to
time, be said to be threatening the interest of the true owner of the
land who did not have any other use for the property?
When it is remembered that the common law looked for a usage of
land analogous to that which would be made by a person claiming an
estate as of right, the decisions (that Miss Piper did establish a possessory interest and Miss Carson did not) become at least explicable, if
not obvious. The requirement that usage be "open" should be treated
as being a means of ascertaining that the claimant to possessory title
has acted in a manner consistent with the holding of an estate in land.
It should not be confused with any expectation on the part of the court
that a paper title holder must be given a warning that his interests
might be endangered. (The test of possessory title grew up before limitations acts in their present form were available and these tests were, in
fact, in place at a time when a true owner's interests could not, at law,
have been endangered by any length of possession by another party.)
Openness of possession was one of the indicia of the existence of a
possessory estate. Similarly, an intention to possess can also be an indicium of a possessory estate in circumstances where the facts of possession are themselves ambiguous. Where the land is in such condition
that a true owner would not be expected to constantly make use of it, a
person who is making such use as a true owner would make may have
his position advanced somewhat by showing that he had, in fact, intended to use the property as his own. The intention in such a case is
an intention with regard to the use of an estate in land, not an intention
with regard to the acquisition of an estate of land. The older law would
not have recognized the idea that a person actually in possession had
anything more to acquire. An intention test is, therefore, not wholly
inappropriate in circumstances of ambiguity. It must not, however, be
allowed to ripen into a threshold test for the assertion of a possessory
interest. In the vast majority of instances, possessory interests arise
36 Carson v. Musialo, [1940] O.R. 398.

1984]

Possessory Title

through mistakes innocently made to which no intention whatever can
be attached.
The statutory branch of the analysis is in many respects parallel to
the common law doctrine. Just as the common law would focus on the
question of whether an estate had been brought into existence, the statute focuses on the question of whether or not "an entry or distress...
or action to recover any land" can be brought. Just as a series of trespasses would not establish an estate at common law for which an "action for recovery" would be the appropriate remedy, a series of trespasses will not provide the foundation for such an action under the
statute. (Trespasses to land are dealt with as "personal actions" under
section 45(1)(g) of the Ontario Limitations Act and have their own
separate limitations periods.) The tests used to establish whether or not
a possessory estate exists are, therefore, appropriate as well to the question of whether or not the right to bring an action to recover land has
existed. Again, open, obvious and continuous occupation are important
considerations, as might be, in ambiguous situations, the establishment
of an intention to use land as a true owner would use it.
The question of the true owner's intention with regard to the land
is not definitive under either the common law or the statutory branch of
the doctrine. As Mr. Justice Anderson pointed out in Beaudoin v.
Aubin, the intention of the true owner is, in fact, a test peculiar to the
jurisprudence of England.
If the analysis which I have been discussing is helpful, the law
dealing with possessory interests might be set out under the following
principles:
a) The common law doctrine that a person in peaceful possession
of land will himself have a species of seised estate from the commencement of such possession remains the foundation of our possessory doctrine;
b) The peaceful possession of land which is to be treated as
amounting to a possessory estate is the type of possession which a
true owner would himself wish to make. Note, however, that this
principle is subject to the qualification that property which is not
in its nature susceptible to some degree of open and continuous
ownership will remain the estate of the paper title holder unless
the claimant to a possessory estate takes unusual measures to establish the existence of his interests;
c) The establishment of a possessory estate can be demonstrated
through a variety of indicia, none of which is either sufficient in its
own right to establish the estate or necessary to establish the estate. Among these indicia are the enclosure of the lands in ques-
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tion, continuous possession, formal repudiation of claims by the
true owner and a demonstrated intention to possess the lands as if
the claimant were the true owner;
d) Where the facts with regard to open, obvious and continuous
possesion are well established an "intention to possess" (animus
possidendi) will be presumed. Indeed, in such circumstances intention is not an issue. Where the facts with regard to possession
are equivocal, and especially where the lands in question would
not in normal circumstances be in continuous use, the subjective
intention of the possessor may be a relevant factor in establishing
the existence of a possessory estate;
e) The analysis which can be employed for the purpose of establishing whether or not a possessory estate would exist at common
law is useful for the parallel purpose of establishing whether or
not a suit to recover the land could (and therefore should) have
been brought under the Limitations Act;
f) At common law a person in possession of land with the permission of the true owner did not run a possessory period. Similarly,
except for the specific instances of tenancies and tenancies-at-will
set out in the Limitations Act, the fact that a person is in possession without the authorization of the paper title holder is a necessary element in the establishment of a right to bring an action to
recover the land and, therefore, a necessary element in the running of a limitations period. For the purposes of the law of Ontario, this is the entire extent of the "adversity" doctrine insofar as
the rights and interests of the holder of paper title are concerned.
V.

CONCLUSION

As was indicated at the outset, cases dealing with possessory title
arise with surprising frequency. What is even more surprising is that
they have in recent years become more, rather than less, confusing in
their approaches to the problem. These inconsistencies appear to have
arisen through insufficient attention to the historical foundations of the
doctrine of possessory estates and the manner in which the Limitations
Act is intended to affect that doctrine. Some of the more recent decisions create a danger that the overall purpose of the Limitations Act,
which is to reduce areas in which disputes can be prosecuted, may be
thwarted by the adoption of a set of rules which will promote, rather
than diminish, litigation. It is in the light of these considerations that
the decision in Beaudoin v. Aubin has provided a welcome restatement
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of some long established doctrines and the decision in Masidon v. Ham
has, rather disappointingly, created new complications.

